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Providing Protection from Torture by
"Unofficial" Actors
A NEW APPROACH TO THE STATE ACTION
REQUIREMENT OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the period since World War II, the use of child
soldiers in armed conflict has risen dramatically.' It is
estimated that over 300,000 children are currently
participating in armed conflicts.' This increase in the use of
child soldiers reflects dramatic changes in the nature of
warfare since World War II, changes that have made the
protection of children and civilians an ever more daunting
© 2004 Josephine A. Vining. All Rights Reserved.
For the purposes of this paper the term "child soldier" refers to persons
under the age of eighteen who are involved in armed conflicts. This term also includes
those who are now over the age of eighteen but were either forcibly or voluntarily
recruited into military service prior to turning eighteen. This definition takes into
account the fact that the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the 1977
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions set fifteen as the minimum age for
recruitment into military service. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened
for signature Sept. 2, 1990, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/49, Art. 38 [hereinafter CRC];
Additional Protocol I, Art. 77(2). However, Article 1 of the CRC states that "a child
means every human being under the age of eighteen years." Furthermore, Graca
Machel's Report on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children contends
that eighteen should be the minimum age for military recruitment. See Report of
Graca Machel, Expert of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Impact of Armed
Conflict on Children, 1 49, U.N. Doc. A/51V150 (1996) [hereinafter Machel Report].
2 See Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers!, available at
http'Jhrw.org/campaigns/crplindex.htm [hereinafter Stop the Use of Child Soldiers].
See also Rachel Brett & Margaret McCullin, CHILDREN: THE INVISIBLE SOLDIERS 19
(1998); Machel Report, supra note 1, 1-5.
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task.' Forced' into service both by insurgent groups and the
governments charged with their protection, child soldiers
witness horrible atrocities, and many who ultimately manage
to escape are left physically disabled and psychologically
traumatized.
One of the most significant factors contributing to the
increased use of child soldiers is the fact that interstate
conflicts are no longer the norm.' Many countries have emerged
from periods of colonial domination only to be plagued by
economic, political and social upheaval.' This disintegration of
societal order has resulted in a surge of internal conflicts
between governments and rebel forces and has left states
struggling for control over their populations and territories.
Indeed, the majority of conflicts in the world today are internal
conflicts fought on religious, ethnic, and nationalistic grounds.'
In 1998 alone, there were violent conflicts in at least twenty-
five countries, twenty-three of which were internal conflicts."'
These internal conflicts "pit neighbour against neighbour,
compatriot against compatriot"" and, in doing so, blur the line
3 See Brett supra note 2, at 20; Amy Beth Abbott, Note, Child Soldiers: The
Use of Children as Instruments of War, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 499, 508
(2000).
4 There are numerous cases of children joining military forces voluntarily.
In areas ravaged by internal conflict, societal norms have broken down to such an
extent that many children view membership in an armed group as their best chance for
survival. Furthermore, many children who have witnessed the murder of family and
friends join out of a sense of revenge. See Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, supra note 2.
However, despite this technically voluntary membership, the choice to join rebel or
government forces is not exercised freely and is instead controlled by a number of other
factors such as poverty and psychological trauma. See Machel Report, supra note 1,
38.
5 See Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, supra note 2.
6 See Brett, supra note 2, at 20. Another significant factor has been recent
technological developments that have resulted in a proliferation of automatic weapons
and lightweight arms. Abbott, supra note 3, at 510. See also Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers supra note 3.
See Machel Report, supra note 1, 22.
" See id., at [ 22-23.
See Abbot, supra note 3, at 508.
1o See CLAUDE BRUDERLEIN, CENTER FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE, THE
ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN BUILDING HUMAN SECURITY: THE CASE OF ARMED
GROUPS IN INTRA-STATE WARS 6 (2000) [hereinafter BRUDERLEIN]. See also Brett,
supra note 2, at 21 ("[Alt any one time in recent years there have been anything up to
fifty armed conflicts in the world, but in no more than two or three of these have the
major protagonists been the armed forces of two sovereign states.").
" BBC News, World: Africa, The Child Victims of War, available at
httpJ/news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/378017.stm. See also Brett, supra note 2, at 20;
BRUDERLEIN, supra note 10, at 6.
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between combatants and civilians. 2 Thus, there is no longer
any definitive barrier to children serving in armed forces; the
battles occur in their homes and villages and it is from these
traditional sanctuaries that children are abducted and forced
into service." In response to this awful reality, the
international community has struggled to develop a
mechanism for their protection.
For those children who have fallen victim to the internal
conflicts that have come to dominate modern warfare, the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) stands as a
possible source of protection and relief.'4 Adopted by the United
Nations in 1984 as a response to the world-wide problem of
torture, the CAT aims to protect the inherent dignity of all
individuals and prohibits "any act by which severe pain and
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person."" The CAT places an affirmative obligation on
state parties to prevent and investigate acts of torture within
their own territory and, most significantly, prohibits states
from returning individuals to another state where there are
"substantial grounds" for believing that they might be
subjected to torture." However, the scope of the CAT is limited
to acts of torture "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity." 7
This state action requirement has generally been
strictly interpreted by the United States courts, an
interpretation that fails to account for the reality of modern
warfare where individuals are often subject to torture by rebel
forces. Moreover, this strict interpretation is out of place both
with the intent and purpose of the CAT and with United States
practice in interpreting similar conventions. In particular, the
Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act or Act)" was enacted for the
12 See Machel Report, supra note 1 22; Brett, supra note 2, at 21.
13 See Machel Report, supra note 1, 37; see also Abbott, supra note 2, at 509
(stating that today's wars occur where recruiters take children from buses, schools,
churches, and their villages).
'4 See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex,
Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter CAT].
I id. at art. 1.
" Id. at arts. 3-5.
I ld. at art. 1.
'5 Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
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purpose of providing asylum to victims of persecution19 and, in
keeping with the intent and purpose of the Act, U.S. courts
have interpreted its state action requirement to allow
protection to individuals who have been persecuted by non-
state actors where the state is either unwilling or unable to
provide protection."0 While the Refugee Act and the CAT
provide protection in different circumstances, the two are
closely related, and individuals often seek relief under both
conventions." Given the similarities between the two, it follows
that the CAT, like the Refugee Act, should be interpreted in
accordance with its purpose of allowing for protection from
torture by non-state actors.
The stories of Bernard Lukwago and Randall Sackie,
two former child soldiers, highlight the failure of the U.S.
courts to adequately protect those who face future torture by
non-state actors. Forced into combat by rebel groups in their
respective countries of Uganda and Liberia, both were victims
of horrific violence at the hands of non-state actors. Their
appeals for relief under the CAT, and the different outcomes of
their appeals, demonstrate the failure of the U.S. courts to
adequately address the increasing problem of torture by
"unofficial" actors.
This Note examines the state action requirement of the
CAT and contends that the requirement should be deemed
satisfied in cases where the state is either unwilling or unable
to prevent acts of torture. Part II of this Note sets forth the
particular facts and details of the Lukwago and Sackie cases.
Part III evaluates the history and purpose of the CAT and the
way in which U.S. courts have struggled between a formalistic
interpretation of its state action requirement and a more
flexible interpretation that takes into account its purpose and
intent. Part IV provides a brief overview of U.S. asylum law
and the way in which the state action requirement of the
19 Unlike the CAT, relief under the Refugee Act does not require a finding of
torture. Instead, a refugee is defined as "any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). For a discussion of the Refugee Act, see infra Part IV.
20 See infra Part IV.
2' For example, both Bernard Lukwago and Randall Sackie sought relief
under the Refugee Act and the Convention Against Torture.
[Vol. 70:1
PROVIDING PROTECTION FROM TORTURE
Refugee Act has been interpreted to allow for protection from
persecution by non-state actors. Despite this more expansive
interpretation of the state action requirement, the Refugee Act
nevertheless fails to adequately protect victims of unofficial
torture. In conclusion, Part V suggests that the state action
requirement of the CAT should be interpreted in a manner
similar to that of the Refugee Act in order to provide protection
to individuals like Lukwago and Sackie who have been tortured
by non-state actors. An interpretation such as this will serve to
harmonize U.S. international treaty obligations while
simultaneously ensuring that the treaties are enforced in
accordance with their intent and purpose.
II. THE CASES OF BERNARD LUKWAGO AND RANDALL
SACKIE
A. Bernard Lukwago
Bernard Lukwago was born on April 11, 1982 in a
remote village in Northern Uganda, just four years before the
Ugandan government became locked in a battle with the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group committed to
overthrowing the government." From the start of the conflict,
children have been targeted by the LRA forces."2 Taken from
their homes, their schools, and the streets, the children
abducted by the LRA are "frequently beaten, and forced to
carry out raids, burn houses, beat and kill civilians, and abduct
other children." 4 Those children who fail to follow the orders of
their abductors are severely beaten and even killed. 5 The
children are also threatened with death if they attempt to
escape and are often forced to beat to death those children who
have attempted to escape." The Ugandan government has been
unable and even unwilling to control the violence in the North,
" See Melissa Dribben, Freeing a Former Child Soldier, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Aug. 3, 2002, www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/3787909.htm?template=contentModules/
printstory.jsp. See also Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and Political
Repression in Uganda (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), Section V, Aug. 1999,
at www.hrw.orgreports/1999/uganda [hereinafter Hostile to Democracy].
See Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda
(Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), March 2003, Vol. 15, No. 7(A) 2 [hereinafter
Stolen Children]. An estimated 20,000 children have been abducted by the LRA.
24 Id. at 2.
25 Id.
26 id.
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and the population remains susceptible to raids by LRA
forces."
The LRA soldiers raided Lukwago's village in August of
1997, when Lukwago was just fifteen years old.' The rebels
attacked his home and shot his parents to death in front of
him.' Lukwago was then captured and taken to a rebel camp
along with three other individuals from his village." Lukwago
remained under the rebels control for the next several months
during which time he was forced to perform heavy manual
labor, engage in fights against government forces, and
accompany the LRA soldiers as they raided other villages.'
Lukwago testified that while he was in captivity at least
one child was killed nearly every day.32 Repeatedly, Lukwago
and the other children were told that they would be killed if
they tried to escape, and two children who attempted to escape
were shot by the rebels in front of the entire camp.3 One day,
Lukwago and his close friend Joseph, whom he had met at the
camp, were ordered to carry stolen weapons and clothing back
to the camp. 4 Joseph became too tired to continue and, after
severely beating Joseph, the rebels forced Lukwago to place a
heavy boulder on Joseph's chest and sit on it until his friend
stopped breathing. Two weeks later, while collecting firewood,
Lukwago escaped.
27 See The Scars of Death: Children Abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army
in Uganda (Human Rights Watch Africa/Human Rights Watch Children's Project, New
York, N.Y.), at http://www.hrw.org/reports97/[Uganda/, § I, Background (page numbers
not available for this source). Note also that the Ugandan government itself has
resorted to the recruitment of child soldiers and the children are used to fight against
the LRA. See Stolen Children, supra note 23, at 2. Furthermore, despite an official
amnesty policy towards former rebel fighters, there is evidence that the Ugandan
government regularly detains former child soldiers for several months at a time and
that the Ugandan military uses former child soldiers to help find LRA landmines. See
U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT: UGANDA (2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt(2000/af/847pf.htm.
See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 164 (3" Cir. 2003); Dribben, supra
note 22.
29 Id. at 164. The court emphasized that none of the other three individuals
taken from Lukwago's village on the night of his abduction were children. Id. at 173.
However, the record does not indicate how old the other abductees were.
30 See id. at 164; Dribben, supra note 22.
31 See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 164. Lukwago participated in at least ten
battles. At the end of each battle, he and other captive children were forced to remove
clothing from the bodies of dead government soldiers.
32 See Dribben, supra note 22.
See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 164.
34 See id. at 164; Dribben, supra note 22.
35 See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 164; Dribben, supra note 22.
36 See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 164; Dribben, supra note 22.
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On November 22, 2000, Lukwago arrived at New York's
Kennedy airport after being denied asylum in the
Netherlands.37 Upon his arrival, Lukwago was taken into
custody by immigration officials." Lukwago applied for relief
under both the Refugee Act of 1980 and the CAT. For the next
three years, Lukwago was mired in litigation surrounding his
asylum claim and on several occasions was threatened with a
forced return to Uganda.'
The initial judgment of the immigration judge, rendered
on August 17, 2001, denied Lukwago's application for asylum
and his application for withholding of removal." Nevertheless,
the immigration judge granted Lukwago's request for
withholding of removal under the CAT. 1 Relying on expert
testimony and the Department of State's Special Advisory
Opinion, the judge determined that Lukwago would likely
suffer persecution at the hands of the Ugandan government if
he was returned as the evidence suggested that "former child
soldiers are punished, detained in pits, and used to clear
minefields."" The decision of the immigration judge was
appealed by both Lukwago and the Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS).'
On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
denied Lukwago's application for asylum, his request for
withholding of removal, and his request for protection under
" See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 164; Dribben, supra note 22. There is some
indication that the asylum proceedings in the Netherlands failed to provide Lukwago
with an opportunity to truly explain his situation. He was initially interviewed by
someone who spoke little more English than himself. Although Lukwago asked for an
interpreter who spoke his native language, none was provided. Dribben, supra note 22.
38 See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 165; Dribben, supra note 22.
39 See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 165.
"' See id.
41 See id. See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (codification of the Convention Against
Torture (CAT)). Under the CAT, torture is defined as "[A]ny act by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity." (Emphasis added.)
42 Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 165. Again, while the Ugandan government has an
official amnesty policy towards former rebel fighters, there is evidence that former
fighters, including children, are imprisoned for several months and used to locate
landmines.
43 See id.
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the CAT." In denying Lukwago relief under the CAT, the BIA
acknowledged that the LRA's treatment of Lukwago
constituted torture,'5 but held that the CAT provides protection
only against torture by government entities or actors, not
against actions by groups that are outside of the government's
control.' The BIA subsequently ordered Lukwago's deportation
to Uganda, and Lukwago appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit.
7
The Third Circuit affirmed the BIA determination that
Lukwago did not qualify for protection under the CAT.' It
stated that the standard of acquiescence is applicable where a
public official has awareness of acts of torture and thereafter
breaches his or her duty to intervene." The court held that
Lukwago had not met this standard of proof and that the
evidence in the case established that the Ugandan government
did not acquiesce in the LRA's activities, but rather was in
continuous opposition to the LRA.' However, the Court of
Appeals did remand the case for further consideration under
the Refugee Act to determine whether Lukwago qualified as a
refugee due to a well-founded fear of future persecution. 1 On
remand, the BIA granted Lukwago political asylum. 52
4 See id. at 166. With regards to Lukwago's asylum application, the BIA
found that Lukwago had failed to establish that he had either suffered past persecution
or had a well-founded fear of future persecution by the Ugandan government or LRA
forces on account of one of the five enumerated grounds outlined in the Refugee Act.
See id.
,, INS v. Lukwago, Case No. A-78-420-780, 1, 6-7 (M.D. Pa. Feb 21, 2002)
[hereinafter BIA Decision I]. [On file with author.)
46 BIA Decision I, at 6. With regards to Lukwago's claim that he would be
tortured by the Ugandan government, the BIA relied on the Ugandan government's
amnesty policy towards former rebel fighters to find that Lukwago would not face
future persecution by the Ugandan government. However, there is evidence that
Uganda does in fact persecute former child soldiers. See supra note 23, at 2. As to the
claim of torture by the LRA, the court held that Lukwago had produced no evidence
that the Ugandan government acquiesced in the activities of the LRA. The Board did
not provide any explanation of how it interpreted the term "acquiescence."
41 See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 166.
48 See id. at 183.
49 See id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. 208.18(a)(7)(2004)).
5o See id.
5' See id.
INS v. Lukwago, Case No. A78-420-780, 1, 1-2 (M.D. pa. Aug. 21, 2003).
Lukwago was granted political asylum on the grounds that Lukwago had a well-
founded fear of persecution as a member of the particular social group of former child
soldiers who have escaped from the LRA and on the basis of the political opinion that
would be imputed to him as an escaped LRA soldier.
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B. Randall Sackie
Like Lukwago, Randall Sackie was forced into service
and subjected to untold horrors by a rebel unit operating
within his country. Sackie was born in 1976 in the midst of an
intense power struggle between the Liberian government and
two rebel groups, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL) and the Independent National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (INPFL).n At the age of fourteen, Sackie, along with
several others from his village, was abducted at gunpoint by
INPFL rebels.' Some individuals in his village resisted capture
and were immediately shot by the rebel forces." After being
taken to the rebel camp, Sackie's arm and back were cut as
part of an initiation rite, and he was selected to join a group
charged with sweeping newly claimed areas.' Sackie was
trained in the use of a machine gun for two weeks, sent out on
missions, and told that his group would be fighting against
government forces. 7 On two or three occasions, Sackie was
ordered to kill women and children. 8
While in INPFL captivity, Sackie witnessed violence
against both his fellow captives and civilians on a daily basis.
He and the other children were threatened with death if they
failed to follow the orders of their captors. The INPFL
reinforced its control over the children by regularly placing
cocaine in their food and giving them alcohol and marijuana.'
Approximately one year after his capture, Sackie witnessed the
kidnapping and violent murder of the Liberian President
Samuel Doe."
Sackie remained with the INPFL forces until a cease
fire was reached in 1993, at which time a West African
organization called the ECOMOG sent troops into Liberia to
disarm the rebel forces." Afraid that he would be killed if
captured, Sackie fled to Guinea, where the United Nations
13 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND
NOTE: LIBERIA, available at http://www.state.gov/r/palei/bgn/6618.htm (June 2004).
4 See Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
55 Id.
5 See id.
5 See id.
See id.
'9 See Sackie, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
60 See id.
6' See id.
62 See id. at 598.
2004]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
helped him to contact his father in the United States.' He was
ultimately granted permanent resident status pursuant to a
family petition and emigrated to the United States in May of
1995.'
In July of 2000, the INS initiated removal proceedings
against Sackie, alleging that he had been convicted six
different times since his arrival for charges ranging from
receipt of stolen property to providing false information to
police officers.' Sackie denied the charges and applied for
asylum and withholding of removal under the CAT.' The
immigration judge found that Sackie had a well-founded fear of
persecution. Further, the judge concluded that Sackie had
neither participated in the persecution of others"7 nor been
convicted of an aggravated felony while in the United States
and thus granted Sackie asylum without considering his CAT
claim." On appeal, the BIA agreed that Sackie had not
participated in the persecution of others but held that he had
failed to meet his burden of establishing a well-founded fear of
future persecution on the basis of one of the enumerated
grounds."9  However, as the immigration court had not
addressed Sackie's claim for relief under the CAT, the BIA
remanded the case for further consideration.0
On remand, another immigration judge determined that
Sackie was not eligible for CAT relief because he had not
established that it was more likely than not that he would be
subjected to torture if returned to Liberia.7' The immigration
judge ordered his deportation.72  The BIA affirmed the
immigration judge's ruling without opinion.7 In response,
Sackie filed a habeas corpus petition with the District Court for
6 See id.
See Sackie, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
r" See id.
6 See id.
67 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, individuals who have
participated in the persecution of others based on one of the five enumerated grounds
are barred from gaining asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A). Furthermore, individuals
who have been convicted of aggravated felonies and are considered a danger to the
United States community will not be granted asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B).
68 See Sackie, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
6 See id.
70 See id.
7 See id.
72 See id. at 601.
73 See Sackie, 270 F. Supp. 2d. at 601.
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking asylum and
withholding of removal under the CAT. 4
On appeal, the District Court granted Sackie relief
under the CAT, citing the torture he might face due to the
unstable conditions in Liberia caused by the civil war.5 The
court recognized the numerous rebel groups active in Liberia
and their practice of recruiting child soldiers."6 In particular,
the court emphasized that Charles Taylor, the President of
Liberia, had himself come to power through the successful
campaign of his own rebel force which had utilized child
soldiers." Moreover, the court stressed that as a child soldier
for INPFL, Sackie had fought directly against Taylor's NPFL
and bore physical markings that would distinguish him as an
INPFL member."8 While commenting that Sackie would clearly
be threatened by Taylor's NPFL government as a result of his
former "membership" in the INPFL, the court also noted that
the government of Liberia had virtually no control over the
country and itself was guilty of numerous human rights
violations." Emphasizing its lack of control, the court observed
that the Liberian government had "virtually no power to
prevent the crimes against humanity which are currently
ongoing throughout the country.""0 Thus, unlike the court in
Lukwago,' the Sackie court read the state action requirement
of the CAT to include behavior by private actors where the
government is either unwilling or unable to protect its citizens
from the infliction of torture by non-state actors.82
III. THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
The universal prohibition against torture is ajus cogens
norm of international law from which no derogation is
permitted.' Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human
74 See id. at 597.
75 See id. at 601.
76 See id. at 601.
1 See id. at 601.
78 See Sackie, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
79 See id.
80 Id.
81 See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 183.
82 See Sackie, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
83 See Dawn J. Miller, Holding States to Their Convention Obligations: The
United Nations Convention Against Torture and the Need for a Broad Interpretation of
State Action, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 299, 299 (2003); see also Winston P. Nagan & Lucie
20041
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Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, expressly states
that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."' This prohibition
against torture is similarly stated in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,"' the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms,86 the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights,87 and the American Convention on Human
Rights,' and is reflective of a newfound recognition of the
individual as an independent subject of international law." In
the midst of the widespread recognition of the prohibition
against torture, the CAT stands as the "most important U.N.
treaty for controlling, regulating, and prohibiting torture and
related practices."' Nevertheless, by refusing to extend the
protection of the CAT to cases where the state is either
unwilling or unable to provide protection from torture by
unofficial actors, U.S. courts have failed to recognize the CAT's
inherent intent and purpose and have left individuals like
Lukwago without relief.
A. The Scope of the CAT and the State Action Requirement
The U.N. adopted the CAT to "make more effective the
struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment throughout the world."' Although the
Atkins, The International Law of Torture: From Universal Proscription to Effective
Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 88 (2001).
84 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/810,
art. 5 [hereinafter UDHR].
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 7 [hereinafter ICCPR].
6 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 71, art. 3 [hereinafter European
Convention].
7 African Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3, art. 5 [hereinafter African Charter].
88 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5, 144
U.N.T.S. 123, 146 [hereinafter American Convention].
89 See Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International
Protection from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents, 31 COLuM. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 81, 101. See also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 249
(3d ed. 1999). For examples of international treaties and declarations that recognize
the inherent rights of individuals, see the ICCPR supra note 83, CRC supra note 1, and
UDHR supra note 84.
80 See Nagan, supra note 83, at 97.
9' CAT, supra note 14, preamble.
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United States took well over a decade to ratify the treaty," its
passage was characterized by the Senate as "an important step
in the continuing battle to end man's inhumanity to man."93 In
the aim of fulfilling its purpose of bringing an end to the use of
torture internationally, the CAT places two important
affirmative obligations on its signatory states. First, under
Article 2, "[e]ach State Party shall take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction."' This obligation
to prevent acts of torture is absolute and "[nio exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."
Second, and most important for the purposes of this Note,
states are prohibited under Article 3 from returning any
individual to a country where there are "substantial grounds"
for believing that he or she would be in danger of being
tortured.'
In determining whether an individual is subject to
protection by virtue of Article 3, a determination must first be
made as to whether or not that individual is in danger of being
subjected to torture if returned to his or her native country.
While numerous international instruments expressly prohibit
the use of torture, the CAT is the first international instrument
to set forth a definition of torture. 7 According to Article 1 of the
CAT, torture is defined as:
[Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
92 The United States signed the CAT in 1988 and the Senate granted its
consent to ratification in October of 1990. However, the U.S. did not become a full
party to the treaty until the Clinton Administration deposited the ratification with the
U.N. in 1994. See Kristen B. Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Torture:
A Viable Alternative for Asylum Seekers, Vol. 74, No. 45 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1773,
1774 (1997).
93 See 136 CONG. REC. 36,196 (1990) (statement of Senator Moynihan).
CAT supra note 14, art. 2.
95 Id.
Id. at art. 3. See also Rosati, supra note 92, at 1774.
97 See generally ICCPR, UDHR, African Charter, American Convention,
European Convention; see also David Weissbrodt and Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle
of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-
Refoulement Provisions of Other International Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 1, 10 (1999).
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suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.9
From this definition, three requirements emerge that
must be met in order to have a viable claim under Article 3 of
the CAT. 9 First, the act must involve the infliction of severe
physical pain or mental suffering." An important caveat to this
requirement is that torture does not include "pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.'' Second, the torturous act must be intentional and
must be done with a certain purpose or objective." For this
reason, there is some debate as to whether pain inflicted for
purely sadistic reasons can qualify as torture." However, it is
generally understood that such acts would necessarily contain
an element of punishment or humiliation and, as such, would
qualify as acts of torture.'"
Finally, and most significantly, the CAT expressly
states that its protection is limited to those acts of torture that
are "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity."' °5 While this limitation emphasizes states as
the primary agents of torture, the inclusion of the term
"acquiescence" necessarily allows for a finding of torture by
non-state actors or entities."' Indeed, to read the definition of
torture as limited to acts of state would conflict with the broad
98 CAT, supra note 14, art. 1. Article 3 of the CAT holds that no state may
return an individual to another state when there are "substantial grounds" for
believing that person will be subjected to torture. While Article 3 does not contain any
state action language, the UNHCR General Comment to the Convention states that
"Article 3 is confined in its application to cases where there are substantial grounds for
believing that the author would be in danger of being subjected to torture as defined in
article 1 of the Convention." Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights,
Implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the Context of article 22, CAT General
Comment 1, U.N. Doc. A/53/44, annex IX (Nov. 21, 1997), httpJ/www.unhchr.ch/
tbs/doc.nsf/0/13719fl69a~a4ff78025672b0050ebal?Opendocument [hereinafter General
Comment].
99 See Weissbrodt, supra note 97, at 10. See also Rosati, supra note 92, at 1775.
100 See Weissbrodt, supra note 97, at 10. See also Rosati, supra note 92, at 1775.
101 CAT, supra note 14, art. 1(1).
102 See Weissbrodt, supra note 97, at 10. See also Rosati, supra note 92, at 1775.
'03 See Weissbrodt, supra note 97, at 10. See also Rosati, supra note 92, at 1775.
"o See Weissbrodt, supra note 97, at 10.
105 CAT, supra note 14, art. 1(1).
106 See Moore, supra note 89, at 94.
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obligation placed upon states in Article 2 to prevent and punish
all acts of torture occurring within their jurisdiction.1 7 Such a
restrictive interpretation would also conflict with the vast
majority of modern human rights treaties, all of which
recognize the obligation of states to protect individuals from
abuses by non-state agents." It is apparent from the travaux
preparatories that the CAT was intended to protect against
acts of torture by non-state actors.1" The travaux preparatories
indicate that the CAT's framers envisioned a liberal system in
which official acquiescence would be implied unless the state
took appropriate action against cases of torture.11 Under the
system envisioned by the framers, the omission or failure of the
state to act in cases of torture would allow for a finding of state
responsibility."'
Such a definition of torture is also consistent with the
customary international law doctrine of imputability, which
holds that "[an act or omission which produces a result which
is on its face a breach of a legal obligation gives rise to
responsibility."11  While the doctrine of imputability does not
automatically attach state responsibility for the actions of
individuals not acting on behalf of the state, state
responsibility will attach if it is determined that the state
failed to take appropriate action.11  For example, if a
government is aware that tribal elders within its territory are
performing female genital mutilation but fails to take action to
107 CAT, supra note 14, art. 1. Note that under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31.
108 See Moore, supra note 89, at 92-93. For examples, see the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which denies to "any state, group, or person any
right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights or freedoms" recognized by the Covenant. ICCPR, supra note 85, art. 5(1). Also
see the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which requires states
party to the treaty to "prohibit and bring an end to racial discrimination by any
persons, group or organization." ICERD, opened for signature March 7, 1966, art.
2(1)(d), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 216-18.
109 See Miller, supra note 83, at 104. See also Samuel L. David, A Foul
Immigration Policy: U.S. Misinterpretation of the Non-Refoulement Obligation Under
the Convention Against Torture, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUMN. RTS. 769, 785-86 (2003).
110 See Miller, supra note 83, at 104. See also David, supra note 109, at 785-86
(2003).
... See Miller, supra note 83, at 304.
112 Miller, supra note 83, at 304. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 439 (4W " ed. 1990) [hereinafter BROWNLIE].
113 See Miller, supra note 83, at 305.
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prevent these acts or punish the perpetrators, then the state
will be liable for its non-feasance." The focus is on what action
by the state would have been appropriate under the
circumstances.115 Whether the government is in fact capable of
controlling the action is irrelevant; instead what matters is
whether the government is taking action to bring an end to the
acts of torture. 116 Building upon these established notions of
state responsibility, this Note further contends that state
responsibility might also be found where the state has taken
some steps to prevent against private acts of torture, but
nevertheless remains unable to fulfill its obligation as a
government to adequately protect its citizens.
Despite the broad interpretation of the state action
requirement that is encouraged by the CAT itself and basic
principles of international law, both the Committee Against
Torture, the adjudicatory branch established by the CAT, and
courts in the United States have largely failed to extend the
CAT's protection to instances where the state acquiesces
through its inability or unwillingness to prevent private acts of
torture. Such a failure contradicts the very purpose and intent
of the CAT and leaves individuals vulnerable to torture in an
era in which non-state actors have become increasingly
powerful.
B. International Interpretation of the CAT: Cases from the
Committee Against Torture
Under Article 17 of the CAT, the Committee Against
Torture (Committee) is charged with oversight of the CAT and
is authorized to hear complaints by individuals against states
for alleged violations of the treaty. 11 7 In three cases, the
Committee has heard complaints by individuals seeking relief
under Article 3 from torture by non-state actors."' In one of the
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 See BROWNLIE, supra note 112, at 439.
117 CAT, supra note 14, art. 17. See also David, supra note 109, at 773. While
Committee decisions are not binding on any states party to the CAT, the Committee's
decisions nevertheless serve as important points of reference for state parties as they
enforce the CAT domestically.
" See G.R.B v. Sweden, CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 (May 15, 1998); Elmi v.
Australia, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (May 25, 1999); S.V. v. Canada, CAT/C/26/D/49/1996
(May 15, 2001).
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three decisions, Elmi v. Australia,"' the Committee found that
a valid claim under the CAT existed absent a fear of torture by
state actors. The decisions of the Committee as to the question
of torture by unofficial actors highlight the struggle between a
formalistic interpretation of the CAT and a more flexible
interpretation that takes into account its intent and purpose.2"
In the earliest case concerning non-state actors, G.R.B.
v. Sweden, which was decided in 1998, the Committee reviewed
a Peruvian citizen's claim that she would be subjected to
torture by both governmental and non-governmental entities if
returned to Peru."' G.R.B. and her family were active in the
Communist Party of Peru. Her parents had been arrested and
imprisoned by state authorities, during which time they were
beaten and tortured.'" On a visit to Peru, G.R.B. was herself
tortured when she was raped by members of Sendero
Luminoso, a rebel group operating in Peru.'" G.R.B. claimed
that, if returned to Peru, she would be subjected to torture at
the hands of the Peruvian government and the Sendero
Luminoso 24 While rejecting her claim for relief on all counts,
the Committee expressly addressed the issue of torture by the
Sendero Luminoso, a non-state group. The Committee held
that "expelling a person who might risk pain or suffering
inflicted by a non-governmental entity, without the consent or
acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the scope of
article 3 of the Convention." '
One year later, however, in Elmi v. Australia, the
Committee approved a claim for relief where the torture feared
was by non-state actors." The claimant was a member of the
Shikal clan in Somalia who had witnessed the execution of his
father and the torture of his brother and sister by members of a
private militia group, the Haiwye, after his father had refused
to provide the militia with financial support."' After the
execution of his father, Elmi was himself threatened by
members of the Haiwye on several occasions and he claimed he
"9 See Elmi, CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 (May 17, 1998).
125 See David, supra note 109, at 777.
12 See G.R.B., 2.1-2.5.
122 See id. at 2.2.
3 See id. at 2.3.
124 See id. at 2.1-2.5.
121 See id. at 6.5.
126 Elmi, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (May 25, 1999).
12 See id. at 2.3.
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would be tortured by the Haiwye militia if returned to
Somalia." In particular, Elmi alleged that the Haiwye militia
was in control of the Somali airports and that he would be
immediately detained and tortured upon arrival."' Australia
countered that Article 3 was not meant to apply to cases of
torture by non-governmental actors. Over the objections of
Australia, the Committee granted Elmi relief, emphasizing the
lack of any official government in Somalia and the de facto
control exercised by rebel forces within Somalia. 13 0 According to
the Committee, the exercise of basic government functions by
the Haiwye meant that its actions fell within the scope of the
phrase "public officials or other persons acting in an official
capacity" found in Article 1 of the CAT. 3'
Although Elmi seemed to signal a willingness on the
part of the Committee to read the state action requirement of
the CAT more liberally and in accordance with its purpose, the
Committee returned to its reasoning in G.R.B. in the recent
case S.V. v. Canada.13' The claimants in S.V. were Tamils from
Sri Lanka and were members of a political party that
advocated the formation of a separate Tamil state." Amidst the
struggle for power in Sri Lanka during the late 1980s, the
claimants were victims of torture at the hands of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), a rebel group seeking control in
the Tamil region of Sri Lanka."' The claimants alleged that, if
returned, they would be tortured by members of the LTTE. The
Committee denied the claimants relief and stated that the
claimants' allegation that they would be tortured by the LTTE,
a non-governmental organization, was outside of the
Committee's jurisdiction."'
The three cases on torture by non-state actors brought
before the Committee demonstrate the inadequacy of the CAT
when it is strictly interpreted to apply to torture by official
actors only. While the Committee did grant relief where the
non-state entity accused of torture was in fact exercising de
facto control, the Committee has not recognized the doctrine of
132 See id. at 13.1.
"9 See id. at 3.1.
130 See id. at 6.5.
131 See Elmi, at T 6.5.
132 See David, supra note 109, at 776-77.
'3 S.V., CAT/C/26/D/49/1996 (May 15, 2001), 2.1, 2.2.
14 See S.V., 2.1-2.5.
135 See S.V., 9.5.
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imputability and has refused to extend the CAT's protection to
cases where a government has failed to properly address cases
of torture occurring within its own territory. Accordingly, the
Committee has failed to follow the CAT in accordance with its
goal of eradicating torture.
C. Domestic Interpretation: The Meaning of State
Acquiescence
The U.S. courts, like the Committee, have been
confronted with cases of individuals seeking relief under
Article 3 from torture by non-state actors. In ratifying the CAT,
the United States set forth a number of qualifications in its
implementation of specific articles.'" As to the state action
requirement of Article 1, the U.S. enactment of the CAT
defines the term "acquiescence" as requiring that a "public
official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have
awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity."'37 The
United States has further stated that actual knowledge of
torture by private actors is not required and that cases of
"willful blindness" will be considered to fall within the scope of
the term acquiescence." The courts, however, have applied a
strict interpretation of these qualifications and, contrary to
Congressional intent, have required a finding of "willful
acceptance" by the state before the state can be said to have
acquiesced in acts of torture by private actors. As a result, the
courts have failed to extend protection to instances where the
state is either unwilling or unable to protect against private
acts of torture.
In In re S-V-, the BIA denied relief under Article 3 to a
native of Colombia and permanent resident of the United
States, who claimed that if returned he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture by non-governmental guerilla forces
and paramilitary groups.'39 The respondent alleged that guerilla
1 See Miller, supra note 83, at 305. See also U.S. State Department, Initial
Report of the United States of America to the UN Committee Against Torture, submitted
by the United States to the Committee Against Torture, October 15, 1999 [hereinafter
Initial Report].
137 See Initial Report, 98.
' See id.
13 See In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306 (2000) (publication page references not
available). The claimant lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident
since he was approximately six months old. The United States initiated exportation
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forces would presume that he had money based on his former
residency in the United States and his inability to speak
Spanish fluently and that he would, therefore, be a natural
target for robbery and kidnapping. " ° In denying relief, the BIA
turned the principle of government acquiescence on its head.
The BIA indicated that in cases of torture by non-state actors
the claimant must show that the state is "willfully accepting" of
such acts."" The BIA then held that regardless of any
determination as to whether or not the respondent was in fact
in danger of being tortured, he failed to establish that the
Colombian government was "willfully accepting" of the
activities of rebel forces within its territory."' In addition, the
BIA explicitly held that Article 3 "does not extend protection to
persons fearing entities that a government is unable to
control.""
The concurring and dissenting opinions in In re S-V-
disagreed with the majority's narrow interpretation of state
acquiescence and indicated that a state may be liable where it
is unable to control acts of torture by private actors. Indeed,
the dissent stated that there is an "open question as to when..
. the loss of internal control by an existing government can
amount to 'acquiescence' that invokes the protection of the
Convention Against Torture."'" Thus, according to the
concurring and dissenting opinions, the determination of
whether relief can be granted under Article 3 where a
government is unable to control the commission of torture by
private actors is not settled and is open for an interpretation
different from that reached by the majority.
The reasoning employed by the BIA in In re S-V- was
reaffirmed in two subsequent CAT cases, In re Y-L-, A-G-, In re
proceedings after the respondent was convicted for committing grand theft. Under the
CAT, unlike the Refugee Convention, relief will not be denied where a person has been
convicted of a crime.
40 See id. at 1307-10.
'' See id. at 1312.
142 See id.
143 See id.
"4 In re S-V- (Board Member Villageliu, concurring). In his concurring
opinion, Board Member Villageliu pointed out that for immigration purposes, the BIA
interpreted the term "government" quite liberally to include political organizations
exercising power over people within a territory. He then pointed out that the rebel
forces in Colombia exercised substantial control over people within their regions. As
such, he contended that there was some argument that the rebel groups were
exercising de facto control. This follows the line of reasoning already established in the
Committee decision, Elmi, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998.
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R-S-R-,'' and Amanfi v. Ashcroft."' In In re Y-L-, Attorney
General Ashcroft denied relief under Article 3 to three criminal
aliens who faced deportation. A-G-, a citizen of Jamaica, argued
that his life had been threatened by a group of individuals
involved in the drug trade in Jamaica and that he would be
murdered upon his return.'7 In the initial proceeding, the
immigration judge determined that the Jamaican government
"cannot or will not control those who wish to persecute the
respondent" and, on this basis, found a government role in the
feared torture and granted A-G- relief under Article 3.8 In
reversing this finding, the BIA held that the Jamaican
government did not bear any liability. Instead, the BIA
reiterated the holding of In re S-V- concerning torture by
private actors, stating that the relevant inquiry is whether the
government is willfully accepting of atrocities occurring within
its jurisdiction. In this case, the Jamaican government had
undertaken efforts at reform and the BIA concluded that these
efforts demonstrated that the government was not willfully
accepting of private acts of torture by drug cartels within its
territory.
While A-G-, a convicted drug dealer, may indeed have
made a weak case for protection under the CAT, the reasoning
of In re S-V- was also employed in more sympathetic settings in
Amanfi v. Ashcroft. Amanfi, a native and citizen of Ghana,
claimed that he had been tortured by "macho men" 4' who had
been hired by members of his ethnic group when they
discovered that he was homosexual." He argued that if
returned to Ghana he would again be subjected to torture at
the hands of "macho men" and that such action would go
unabated by the Ghanian police force. 5 ' The court denied
Amanfi's petition for relief under the CAT, siding with the INS
contention that "macho men are private actors not associated
"5 In re Y-L, In re A-G, In re R-S-R, 23 1 & N Dec. 270 (B.I.A. 2002).
146 Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (2003).
14 See In re Y-L- at 281.
148 In re Y-L- at 282. The immigration judge emphasized the corruption that
plagued the Jamaican police force and the connection between corrupt police and drug
cartels in the region. In particular, the immigration judge emphasized that the drug
dealers would be capable of bribing Jamaican officials to arrest A-G- on false pretenses
and then seek their revenge.
14' Amanfl, 328 F.3d at 724. The court adopted the definition of"macho men"
utilized by the State Department and stated that macho men are private security
guards hired by individuals to settle disputes.
'"o Id. at 721-23.
"'. Id. at 725.
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with the government of Ghana. 52 Moreover, the court held that
the Ghanian authorities could only be held liable for the
actions of "macho men" if Amanfi established that Ghanian
officials were aware of the actions and breached their legal
responsibility to intervene." Thus, the Amanfi court followed
the precedent set by In re S-V- and held that state
responsibility cannot be found in cases where the state is
unable to stop acts of torture.
In contrast to the BIA rulings in In re S-V- and its
progeny, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in its recent
decision, Zheng v. Ashcroft, returned to an interpretation of the
state action requirement that is consistent both with
Congressional intent in enacting the CAT and with the very
purpose and intent of the CAT itself. Zheng, a citizen of China,
was smuggled into the United States at the age of sixteen by
"snakeheads," seamen engaged in the field of human
smuggling." The snakeheads constitute a powerful
organization in China and have engaged in the worst forms of
torture, including dismemberment of individuals who fail to
pay debts owed. 5 Zheng alleged that if returned to China he
would face torture at the hands of the snakeheads and that the
Chinese government would fail to provide any protection as
their existence was not recognized by the government of the
People's Republic of China (PRC)."
In its decision granting Zheng relief under the CAT, the
court expressly rejected the reasoning employed by the BIA in
In re S-V- and found that the requirement of willful acceptance
by the government was too restrictive, impermissibly narrow,
and ignored clear Congressional intent. '57 The court instead
returned to the language utilized by the Senate in enacting the
CAT and found that the proper inquiry is whether public
officials have awareness of acts of torture and turn a "blind
eye" to its occurrence." The reasoning employed by the Zheng
court, like that employed by the Sackie court, adheres closely to
the intent and purpose of the CAT and the intent of Congress
in enacting the treaty. Read together, Zheng and Sackie allow
152 Id. at 725.
15- See id. at 726.
"4 See Zheng v. Ahscroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003).
155 See id. at 1189.
1 6 See id.
157 See id. at 1194.
158 Id. at 1196.
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for an interpretation of the CAT that escapes the unrealistic
and restrictive BIA approach. These judicial opinions would
allow individuals facing torture by non-state actors to seek its
protection either where the government is unwilling, as was
the case in Zheng, or unable, as was true in Sackie, to provide
protection.
IV. U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND THE STATE ACTION
REQUIREMENT: A MODEL FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
As discussed above, several decisions concerning the
CAT have adopted a strict interpretation of its provisions on
state accountability. In doing so, the courts have largely
ignored both the purpose of the CAT and clear Congressional
intent and have denied protection to those individuals who
have fallen victim to torture by non-state actors. To bring U.S.
jurisprudence regarding the CAT into compliance with its
purpose and with Congressional intent, the state action
requirement of the CAT should be read to include those cases
where the state is either unwilling or unable to provide
protection. Court should utilize the Refugee Act, and its similar
requireinent of a state nexus, as an example of how to interpret
the state action requirement of the CAT to include private acts
of torture.
A. The Refugee Convention of 1951 and U.S. Adoption of
the Refugee Act of 1980
In the aftermath of World War II, the international
community and the newly-formed United Nations were forced
to develop a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem; a
solution that would provide a clear definition of "refugee" and
afford such an individual broad protections. 9' To that end, the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) was established in 1950 and charged with resolving
the refugee problem." In 1951, delegates from twenty-six
19 See The Wall Behind Which Refugees Can Shelter: The 1951 Geneva
Convention, United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (2001) at 11 [hereinafter
The Wall].
160 See id. at 8. It was initially hoped that the refugee crisis could be resolved
quickly and the UNHCR was therefore only given a three-year mandate. However,
such a quick resolution proved impossible and the UNHCR remains the principal
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participating countries convened in Geneva and hammered out
the Refugee Convention of 19512" Article 1 of the Refugee
Convention, together with its 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee
as someone who is outside of his country of origin and who as a
result of having a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion" is either unable or
unwilling to "avail himself of the protection of that country."'2
The definition of refugee currently in force in the United
States was established through the passage of the Refugee Act
of 1980." Although the Act was substantively characterized as
a reflection of "one of the oldest themes in America's history-
welcoming homeless refugees to [its] shores,"'" procedurally it
served the purpose of bringing United States refugee law into
conformity with the Refugee Convention. Indeed, bringing the
United States into conformance with the Refugee Convention is
widely regarded as one of the primary purposes of the Act."
With some minor deviations, the Refugee Act of 1980 expressly
adopts the definition outlined in the Refugee Convention."
Under the Act, a refugee is defined as:
[Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
agency of the United Nations concerned with refugees. See Guy S. GOODWiN-GILL, THE
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1983).
.61 See The Wall, supra note 159, at 8. See also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note
160, at 12.
112 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafter the Refugee Convention] at Article 1. The Refugee Convention was
initially viewed as a quick solution to the refugee problem, and therefore included only
those individuals who qualified as refugees as a result of events occurring before
January 1, 1951. Refugee Convention Art. 1. However, in 1967, the Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees entered into force and the time restraint was lifted. Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606
U.N.T.S. 267, 269.
" See Pub. L. No. 96-212, §201(a), 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended 8 U.S.C.
§1102(a)(42)(A)).
1 Pub. L. No. 96-212, Sen. Rep. 96-256, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, July 23, 1979
165 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987); see also Karen K.
Jorgensen, The Role of the U.S. Congress and Courts in the Application of the Refugee
Act of 1980, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 129
(Greenwood Publishing Group, Ved P. Nanda 1989).
166 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436; Jorgensen, supra note 165, at 129;
Moore, supra note 89, at 101.
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religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."6 7
Thus, regardless of whether the purpose of the Act was
to further traditional American goals of providing aid to the
needy or was simply regarded as a necessary step in bringing
U.S. asylum law into compliance with international standards,
the definition is formulated along the same lines as the
Refugee Convention and brings with it the same requirements
for a finding of persecution.
B. The Refugee and the State Action Requirement
The definition of refugee that is outlined both in the
Refugee Convention and in the Refugee Act requires that the
individual claiming refugee status be either unable or
unwilling to avail him or herself of the protections of his or her
country of origin." Thus, in both documents, there is a strong
emphasis on the lack of state protection." However, despite the
seeming emphasis on the failure of the state to protect the
individual from persecution, neither document expressly
requires that the state itself be the agent of the persecution
feared."7 Instead, it is largely understood, both internationally
and domestically, that where an individual has suffered
persecution on one of the five enumerated grounds and where
protection from future harm is not available in the country of
origin, he or she should be eligible for refugee status regardless
of who is responsible for the persecution. 1'
Extending the protection of the Refugee Convention to
individuals who have been persecuted by non-state actors is
also consistent with the interpretation of the Convention
promulgated by the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees in its Handbook of guidelines for interpreting the
167 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000).
168 Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000); Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152.
1 See Moore, supra note 89, at 102.
170 See id. at 102.
171 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 160, at 42 (stating that the concept of
persecution is not limited to government actors and their agents). See also The Wall,
supra note 158, at 17 ("The origin of the persecution ... should not be decisive in
determining whether a person is eligible for refugee status. What is important is
whether a person deserves international protection because it is not available in the
country of origin."). However, while decidedly in the minority, Austria, France,
Germany and the Netherlands have all refused asylum to those individuals who fear
persecution by non-state agents. See Moore, supra note 89, at 108.
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Convention.17 The Handbook addresses the various elements of
the refugee definition and expressly recognizes that agents of
persecution need not themselves be agents of the state.'
According to Paragraph 65 of the handbook, "[wihere serious
discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the
local populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are
knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities
refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection.""' A state
is considered unwilling to provide protection when it is
complicit in, or at least tolerant of, the persecution that is
feared by the individual.'75 A state is considered unable to
provide protection when the state apparatus has been
compromised or rendered dysfunctional by internal conflict.'76
Thus, according to Paragraph 65, a person who has a well-
founded fear of persecution by non-state actors on the basis of
one of the enumerated grounds is eligible for refugee status
when the state of origin is either unwilling or unable to protect
that individual from the type of harm that is feared."7
While the Handbook guidelines are not binding on any
of the states party to the Refugee Convention, the Handbook is
widely utilized by states in enforcing their own refugee laws.7 '
The Handbook has provided "significant guidance" in
construing U.S. obligations under the Refugee Convention, and
it is regularly relied on by the courts in determining whether
an individual qualifies for refugee status.7' For example, in
McMullen v. INS, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
granted asylum to a former member of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA), an anti-government organization,
who feared reprisals from the PIRA due to his refusal to
participate in their terrorist activities." In setting out the
requirements for refugee status, the court held that McMullen
had the burden of proving persecution either by the
... See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES,
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1979; Reedited
1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook].
... See id.
174 Id.
171 See Moore, supra note 89, at 103.
176 See id.
117 See id. See also Moore, supra note 89, at 103.
178 See Moore, supra note 89, at 102.
179 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 n. 22.
"0 McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (1981).
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government or "by a group which the government is unable to
control."18 ' In doing so, the court expressly recognized that state
action is not a requirement for refugee status and that the
Refugee Act protects against persecution by non-state actors.
Since McMullen, U.S. courts have consistently held that
persecution within the meaning of the Refugee Act includes
persecution by non-governmental groups that the government
is either "unwilling or unable to control[.]"18 In particular,
courts have recognized that fear of persecution from anti-
government guerilla groups can constitute persecution within
the meaning of the Refugee Act. i" In Bolanos-Hernandez v.
INS, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
individual who had alleged persecution on the basis of his
political opinion by an anti-government guerilla group was
eligible for asylum." For the purposes of this analysis, it is
significant that the court emphasized that the INS made no
contention that the government of El Salvador was either
willing or able to protect Bolanos from feared persecution and,
as such, he was eligible for relief under the Refugee Act." In
another case concerning a refugee fleeing guerilla violence in
El Salvador, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while
remanding the case to the BIA for further review, noted that
the threat of persecution need not come from the government
but can also come from anti-government guerilla
organizations." As applied by a number of courts in the United
States, the Refugee Act does not require state action and
instead grants relief to those individuals whose country of
origin is either unwilling or unable to protect them from
persecution by non-state actors.
Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1315 n. 22. See also Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (1988);
Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1284 (1985).
'83 See Vasquez v. INS, 177 F.3d 62 (1999); Arteaga, 836 F.2d 1227; Bolanas-
Hernandez, 767 F.2d 1277.
'84 See Bolanas-Hernandez, 767 F.2d 1277.
185 See id. at 1284.
,86 See Arteaga, 836 F.2d at 1231. Note, however, that while persecution by
non-government actors does in fact qualify as persecution within the meaning of the
Refugee Act, the individual seeking asylum must demonstrate that the harm
threatened is widespread and not confined to one area or region of the country. Thus,
if relocation in another part of the country would in itself protect an individual from
persecution by non-state actors, asylum will not be granted. See Matter of Fuentes, 19
I. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA 1988).
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C. The Failure of the Refugee Act to Adequately Protect
Victims of Persecution by Non-State Actors
Although U.S. courts have generally held that
persecution by non-state actors qualifies an individual for relief
under the Refugee Act, they have also developed a very strict
approach to determining whether persecution occurs on the
basis of one of the enumerated grounds.187 Some commentators
argue that such a "[sitrict standard[U of causation U tend[s] to
disproportionately burden claims of persecution at the hands of
non-state agents, whose motivations are often shrouded in
uncertainty, and therefore difficult to prove."'" In INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, the Supreme Court denied asylum to a native of
Guatemala who fled his country in order to escape forced
conscription by anti-government guerillas.89 While not denying
that persecution by non-government guerilla forces could
constitute persecution, the Supreme Court nevertheless held
that Elias-Zacarias failed to demonstrate that the guerillas
persecuted him on account of his political opinion rather than
on the basis of his refusal to join their ranks. ° While this strict
standard of causation is applied to all asylum applicants, it
puts a greater burden on those fleeing persecution by non-state
actors as definitive proof of their motivations is more elusive.191
The difficulty of finding persecution based on one of the
enumerated grounds where the persecutor is a non-state entity
was precisely the problem faced by the BIA and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in determining whether Lukwago had
in fact suffered persecution on account of his membership in a
political group or his political opinion. The inability of the
Refugee Act to adequately protect victims of unofficial torture
highlights the necessity for a reading of the CAT that provides
for greater protection from persecution by non-state actors.19
187 See Moore, supra note 89, at 111.
189 See id.
189 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) [hereinafter Zacarias].
19' Id. at 483. The Zacarias decision "has become synonymous with the so-
called 'nexus' requirement in U.S. asylum law, or the necessity that the applicant prove
with great precision the basis for the persecution she fears." See Moore, supra note 89,
at 112.
,9, See Moore, supra note 89, at 114. Note also that such a strict causation
requirement conflicts with Paragraph 81 of the UNHCR Handbook which recognizes
that "it may not always be possible to establish a causal link between the opinion
expressed and the related measures suffered or feared by the applicant." UNHCR
Handbook, supra note 172, 81.
192 Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2003).
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The Refugee Convention as enacted both domestically
and internationally recognizes the reality of the modern world
and grants protection to those who have been tortured by non-
state entities. In determining whether an individual qualifies
for relief under the Convention, the proper inquiry requires a
determination of whether the state is either unwilling or
unable to protect the individual from persecution. However, the
requirement that the persecution be committed on the basis of
one of the five enumerated grounds unnecessarily burdens
those who have been victims of unofficial torture. As such, the
Refugee Act should not be viewed as an alternative form of
relief for individuals who have been tortured by non-state
actors. As demonstrated above, the Refugee Act fails to provide
absolute protection to victims of unofficial persecution and it is
therefore of critical importance that the CAT be interpreted to
grant relief in instances where a state is either unwilling or
unable to provide protection. To do otherwise contravenes the
purpose of the treaty and denies relief to the very individuals
that it was created to protect.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, internal conflicts have come to
dominate the lives of countless individuals. The lines between
civilians and soldiers, children and adults, have become
blurred, and in the process innocent children have fallen victim
to unspeakable forms of torture. The CAT was established for
the purpose of eradicating torture internationally."93 In ratifying
the treaty domestically, the United States thereby committed
itself to "the international fight against torture"" and to
enforcing the CAT in accordance with its purpose and intent.'95
However, the United States has failed to fulfill its obligations
as a party to the treaty and has consistently denied protection
to individuals such as Lukwago who are victims of torture at
the hands of non-state actors.
That the CAT was intended to cover cases of torture by
unofficial actors is evident in the travaux preparatories for the
treaty, which indicate the intent of the drafters to include acts
of torture by non-state actors.'6 Moreover, the very language of
193 CAT, supra note 14, preamble.
194 See Initial Report, supra note 137.
'9* Vienna Convention, supra note 107, Art. 31.
196 See Miller, supra note 83, at 104; see also David, supra note 109, at 785-86.
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the statute implementing the CAT in the United States allows
its protection to extend to acts of private torture.'97 Under U.S.
law, acquiescence does not require a finding of willful
acceptance and instead requires only that the state have
"awareness" of acts of torture and that it thereafter breach its
duty to intervene to stop such activity.98
In In re S-V- and its progeny, however, the U.S. courts
have ignored clear congressional intent and have imposed their
own judicially created requirement of "deliberate acceptance." '
This unduly restrictive interpretation contradicts the purpose
and intent of the CAT and fails to recognize U.S. obligations as
a signatory to the CAT.
Looking to the Refugee Act as a model, the U.S. should
extend the protection of the CAT to instances where the state is
either unwilling or unable to provide protection. The decisions
reached in Sackie v. Ashcroft"° and Zheng v. Ashcroft 1 present
a move towards an interpretation that is more consistent both
with the purpose of the CAT and with the reality of modern
warfare. Read together, the two cases allow for an
interpretation of the CAT that will provide protection where
the state is either unwilling, as in Zheng, or unable, as in
Sackie, to provide protection. Such an interpretation follows
along the same lines as the interpretation given to the state
action requirement in the Refugee Act and is consistent with
the purpose and intent of the CAT.
Josephine A. Vining'
197 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(7).
198 Id.
199 See Part III, supra.
See Sackie, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
201 See Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1186.
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